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Abstract. We study a model of opinion formation where the opinions in conflict are
not equivalent. This is the case when the subject of the decision is to respect a norm
or a law. In such scenarios, one of the possible behaviors is to abide by the norm
and the other to ignore it. The evolution of the dynamics is implemented through an
imitation mechanism, in which agents can change their opinions based on the opinions
of a set of partners and their own state. We determine, for different social situations,
the minimum percentage of supporters of the law necessary to arrive to a state of
consensus of law-abiders.
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1. Introduction
Elaborating on the seminal work of Axelrod on the dissemination of culture [1], and
the pioneering papers of Galam [2, 3], a number of opinion formation models have been
formulated in recent years. Their authors try to capture the fundamental processes
that determine the emergency or not of consensus in a population (see an up-to-date
review in Ref. [4]). Most of these studies assume that the agents must choose between
equivalent options. However, in many social situations opinions may be endowed with an
intrinsic value derived from cultural, ethical or legal foundations. Possible examples are
the decision of using a cell phone while driving a car, of stopping at the red light, of not
driving after drinking, or no double park. One could also consider dietary, clothing and
ritual prescriptions in many cultures. Even rules of etiquette that are not mandatory, in
many cases make social coexistence easier. In all the preceding examples the choices are
not equivalent, since there exist legal or customary values associated with them. In such
a context, options or opinions should be associated to a scale of values. The decision
to choose one or the other is greatly influenced by the agents’ background (education,
respect of cultural values), their idiosyncrasy, the pressure of the social environment
and of the authorities; it cannot be ruled out, also, that an agent could act on the spur
of the moment. Eventually, not abiding by the law can result in some kind of penalty,
such as a fine or even prison [5].
In the theory of social impact, the influence between individuals is analyzed from
a psychological point of view [6]. In accordance with this view, the influence of a social
group on an agent depends on the number of individuals in the group, on their persuasion
power, and on the distance from the subject (either spatial or in the abstract sense of
personal relationships). The interplay of both persuasion and authority in a hierarchical
system was studied in [7]. As we said, a fundamental contribution to this subject
comes from the model introduced by Axelrod [1, 8], which includes two fundamental
mechanisms: social influence (tendency to became more similar with the interactions)
and tendency of similar persons to attract each other and interact more frequently.
The model predicts not only a convergence to a single culture but also persistence of
diversity in some particular cases. Finally, the resistance of a society to the convergence
of its members’ opinions has been considered in [9], and a mean field approach of the
“stubborn” society has been studied in [10]. In both cases a homogeneously stubborn
population was considered, while individual variation of obstinacy is a more reasonable
approach, and it is the one we follow here.
In this paper we study a simplified instance of such a problem. We consider a
system where the agents may adopt one of two options with different values. We take
into account the fact that social influence can play a major role in the choice of a given
opinion. As a model of such influence, we propose an imitation behavior, where agents
tend to imitate the behavior of the others, which may be the right or the wrong one.
This is the approach followed in other recent studies of the formation and propagation
of opinion, such as the herding model found in [11] and the voting model of [12]. As
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a result of this influence, agents can change their opinion. At variance with models
where the opinions are equivalent, the choice will here depend not only on the agent’s
obstinacy and number of social contacts, but also on the value of their opinions.
We will show that in many cases, it is possible to induce a major change in the
opinion of the population by setting a fraction of polite or educated agents (those
supporting the “right” option, acting like the “seeds” in [12]). Their influence will be
able to generate a change in the society in a reasonable period of time. The fraction of
educated agents necessary to induce a global change in opinion depends on the relative
value of the opinions, on the average adamancy and on the connectivity of the network.
In the next section we describe the model while in section 3 the results will be
presented for different scenarios. Discussion of the results and conclusions follow in
section 4.
2. Model of Opinion Dynamics
Let us consider a population of N interacting agents, each of them having an opinion
attribute and a tendency to conserve this opinion, that we call adamancy. We assume
that the opinion of each agent has a “value” denoted by x, being x ∈ {x1, x2}, where
x2 > x1, implying that opinion 2 is more valuable than opinion 1. For example opinion
2 can be identified with abiding by a given rule, while opinion 1 means a tendency
to ignore it. Individuals are also characterized by an adamancy factor a, which they
keep for the whole time evolution, measuring their resistance to change their current
opinion‡. We have considered both the case of an homogeneous adamancy and of a
randomly distributed one. Finally, agents may change their opinions as a result of their
mutual interactions.
The dynamics of the system is as follows. At each time step an agent i is picked up
at random. This agent will be prompted to change its opinion because of the influence
of a group of k individuals. These are chosen at random at each interaction event in
the current well-mixed implementation of the model. After the selection of this group
of influence, a poll is performed:
If: aixi+nixi−(k−ni)x
′
i
{
≥ 0 then agent i keeps opinion xi,
< 0 then agent i changes to opinion x′
i
,
(1)
where ni is the number of agents (belonging to the influence group of size k) sharing
the same opinion as agent i, and x′
i
is the alternative opinion sustained by the rest of
the agents: k − ni.
It is possible to see that there is a competition between the two opinion values. On
the one side we have the agents with the same opinion as agent i, and on the opposite
side the agents with the alternative opinion. In addition, we see that agent i weighs his
own opinion (and only this one) with his adamancy ai. As an example, let us suppose
‡ If a < 1, the same parameter could serve as the opposite of stubbornness, since one’s own opinion
weighs less than that of others.
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that x1 = 1 and x2 = 2. Let us say that agent i has the lower opinion, i.e., xi = 1. If
we set k = 4 (four agents in the group of influence), and we consider that two of them
share the lower opinion, x = 1, whereas the other two have the higher opinion value
x = 2, then opinion 1 will sum O1 = ai× 1+ 2× 1 = ai +2, whereas opinion 2 will sum
O2 = 2 × 2 = 4. If ai < 2 then O1 < O2, opinion 2 will be the winner of the poll and
agent i will change his opinion from 1 to 2. Thus, in this case, agent i will adopt the
higher valued opinion.
This description emphasizes the weight of the agent’s own opinion, with a central
role played by his adamancy or stubbornness. This is an important point of view of
human psychology and behavior, and for this reason we chose to write Eq. (1) in this
way. Observe, however, that one can alternatively scale the local parameters with the
size of the influence group ki. Defining wi = ai/ki as the weight of the agent’s own
opinion in the poll (his adamancy “diluted” among his group of influence), and dividing
Eq. (1) by ki we can write:
If: wixi+sixi− (1−si)x
′
i
{
≥ 0 then agent i keeps opinion xi,
< 0 then agent i changes to opinion x′
i
,
(2)
where si = ni/ki is the fraction of agent’s i partners supporting the same opinion as
his. The number of parameters in the dynamics described by Eq. (2) is the same as in
Eq. (1), and a change of perspective is achieved: the competition between the weighted
opinions scales with the size of the group of influence, and in this sense it becomes
uniformly defined in the population.
The process defined by Eqs. (1) or (2) is then iterated by selecting agents at random.
The final state will depend on the level and distribution of adamancy a of the population,
on the fraction fh of agents that have initially the higher opinion, and also on the
distribution of k.
The dynamics just described has only two attractors in a strict sense: consensus
of opinion 1 or consensus of opinion 2. Nevertheless, the time needed to reach such
stable states can be extremely long. For intermediate times, as we will show in the next
section, the system seems to have metastable states in which the two opinions coexist
in the population.
There is a note to be made about the relative value of the opinions. In the example
we fixed the value of the higher (desirable) opinion as double that of the other, and
this is also the case that we will analyze in most of our results below. This choice is
arbitrary and could be different in different real situations. In general, laws and norms
are created to rule unresolved conflicts. For example, the priority on a crossing to avoid
accidents, the prohibition to use cell phones while driving or of smoking in closed areas
belong to this class. It is clear that one of the opinions has a higher value, but it is not
so clear how to quantify it. We adopt for the moment the values x1 = 1 and x2 = 2,
and in the final section we discuss the effect of choosing different numerical values for
the opinions. Anticipating on the results, different cases were observed: for some values
of a and fh the system arrives to a consensus, where all agents share the same opinion.
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When the adamancy is high enough, a frozen state is achieved in which the two opinions
coexist in the population.
In the following section we present our results for different distributions of the
adamancy a and the average connectivity 〈k〉.
3. Results
We have analyzed several cases, from the simplest ones to more “realistic” situations.
We start with a simple situation consisting of an homogeneous adamancy and a fixed
number of agents in the group of influence. Then, we consider a random distribution
for the adamancy, keeping the number of connections constant and the same for all
agents. Finally we describe the case where the number of connections is random, but
the adamancy is the same for all the agents. In our numerical simulations the value of the
opinions will be 1 and 2, while a more general case with a continuous of opinion values
is exhaustively analyzed in the last section. The system size was fixed at N = 1000
agents since no significant dependence with size was observed (at variance with the
models analyzed in [13]). The time necessary to reach the final states does depend on
the system size, naturally; but neither the phase diagrams nor the temporal evolution
of the populations of each state do. We will discuss the final times of evolution more in
depth below, at the end of Section 3.1.
3.1. Homogeneous adamancy and connectivity
Consider a situation where each agent interacts with the same number of partners,
chosen at random. The simplest case is a pairwise interaction, i.e. each agent interacts
with only another one. If both interacting agents share the same opinion, there are no
changes. On the other hand, we have that either:
• Agent i supports opinion 1 (xi = 1). If ai < 2, agent i will be convinced by j to
change his opinion from 1 to 2.
or:
• Agent i supports opinion 2 (xi = 2). If ai < 0.5, agent i will be convinced by j to
change his opinion from 2 to 1.
The consequences of these two conditions can be seen in Fig. 1(a) as vertical
lines. The phase diagram shows the final state of the system in a space defined by
the scaled adamancy w = a/k and the fraction fh of initially supporters of the higher
valued opinion x = 2. The region with adamancy lower than 0.5 corresponds to the
most voluble populations. In this region, the agents convince each other at random.
Therefore, the fraction of agents supporting each opinion fluctuates stochastically until
the population collapses to a state of consensus. On average, the time needed for this
collapse and the value of the consensus opinion depend on the initial state. For example,
an initial condition with a large fraction of individuals holding one of the opinions will
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Figure 1. Phase diagrams for k = 1 (a) and k = 100 (b). Regions colored grey
correspond to states of coexistence of opinions. White corresponds to consensus of
either opinion, as shown. Black indicates a transition region. Finally, light gray in
panel (a) indicates a fluctuating state. All simulations consist of 100 realizations per
point in the phase diagrams. Note that the horizontal axis represents the weight of
the agent opinion w ≡ a/k.
collapse quickly to a state of consensus of the same opinion, with high probability (black
regions in Fig. 1(a)). When the initial fractions of agents holding each opinion are not
very different (light grey region in Fig. 1(a)), the time to reach consensus can be much
longer than the one used in the simulations (fixed in 100 interactions per agent, which is a
reasonable assumption in the context of social interactions). When the scaled adamancy
has intermediate values (0.5 < w < 2) the final state is a consensus of opinion x = 2
(white region in Fig. 1). Finally, for very stubborn populations there is coexistence of
opinions for all values of fh, reflecting the fact that no interaction ends up in a change
of opinion. This is a “frozen” stable state, since for high values of the stubbornness no
agents modify their opinion.
On the other hand, if we increase the number of interacting agents (chosen at
random in each interaction step) the situation is different. The corresponding phase
diagram is shown in Fig. 1(b), for k = 100 (which is close to a mean field scenario in our
system of N = 1000 agents). It is possible to see that the higher opinion is always the
winner if the number of educated people is greater than a critical value that depends
on the adamancy of the population. This critical fh (painted black in the figure) grows
with adamancy—as expected—for w > 0.5. Observe that there is a minimum of the
critical fh around w ≈ 0.3, where a fraction of educated agents (30%) is enough to
convert the whole population to opinion 2. We remark that, as the abscissa is w = a/k,
Do the right thing 7
0 10 20
0.0
0.5
1.0
0 5 10
0.0
0.5
1.0
0 500 1000 1500
0.0
0.5
1.0
0 50 100
0.0
0.5
1.0
(a)
fx
x=1
 
 
x=2
(b)
 
 
x=2
(d)(c)
 
 
x=2
 
 t / Nt / N
fx
x=1
x=1
 
 
 
x=1
x=2
Figure 2. Evolution of the system state, corresponding to four points in parameter
space: (a) fh = 0.01, k = 1, 〈a〉 = 2, σa = 0.2 (this is one of the heterogeneous systems
analyzed below in Section 3.2), (b) fh = 0.01, a = 1.8, k = 1, (c) fh = 0.7, a = 150,
k = 100, (d) fh = 0.1, a = 0.3, k = 1.
this condition is attained for any reasonable values of the adamancy. Below the critical
fh we find a region of two-clusters states, which is metastable with a slow dynamics.
For w > 2 all the two-clusters states become stable, frozen at the initial condition—as
in the case k = 1. Finally, a region of prevailing opinion 1 occupies the lower-left corner
of low adamancy and little initially educated agents. In this region, a larger value of fh
is necessary to impose opinion 2 for lower values of adamancy.
We have observed that intermediate values of k show a behavior qualitatively similar
to the one shown for k = 100 in Fig. 1(b). Only the case k = 1 stands out as qualitatively
different, as described. Below, in Fig. 4, we will show some results for one of the
intermediate cases, k = 10.
The results just discussed correspond to final states of the dynamics accessible
during the numerical simulation. We have observed that many situations present very
long transient times, and since the model pretends to mimic a social system, it could
be helpful to address the question of the time needed to achieve the final state. In a
real society the process to reach a state of consensus cannot take an unreasonable large
number of interactions. This is the reason why we choose a finite number of interactions
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(100 per agent, in average) to construct the phase diagrams, even though in some regions
the stable states are not the ones observed in our simulations. As an extreme, we note
that both consensus are stable almost anywhere, since they cannot be invaded by a
minimal perturbation consisting of a single agent of the opposing opinion. To better
understand the dynamic behavior of our system, observe the transients shown in Fig. 2.
On Fig. 2(a) we see the system rapidly evolving into a coexisting state of opinions
1 and 2. Fig. 2(b) shows a similarly fast evolution towards a consensus of opinion
2. Figure 2(c) shows a much longer transient state, corresponding to the transition
between the region of consensus of opinion 2 and the metastable region of coexistence
(the thin black region in Fig. 1(b)). Finally, Fig. 2(d) shows the slow evolution of the
low adamancy region of Fig. 1(a): from a practical point of view, this society is living
in a (fluctuating) state of coexisting opinions.
Observe also Fig. 3, which shows the time necessary to reach the final state, as a
function of fh, for a given value of adamancy. Panel (a) corresponds to k = 100 and
a = 0.25k, while panel (b) shows the case k = 100, a = k, both corresponding to vertical
cuts in Fig. 1(b). The first one shows a peak corresponding to the transition between
the two regions of consensus. The second one shows the transition between the region
of two clusters and the region of “right” (x = 2) consensus. One sees that well within
the region of consensus the system evolves rapidly to reach the final state. Going from
higher to lower values of fh and close to the transition line, the transient time grows
abruptly (corresponding to the slow evolution seen in Fig. 2(c)). Finally, for fh < 0.5,
the maximum simulation time is reached without abandoning the two-clusters state (but
reaching a stationary state in a short time, as seen in Fig. 2(a)). In the previous figures
we used the criterion of 100 interactions per agent as maximum simulation time. This
case is shown as a full line in Fig. 3(b). The two other lines correspond to two different
choices of this criterion: the dotted line (smaller times) corresponds to 10 interactions
per agent, while the dashed one (much longer times, note the logarithmic scale) to 104
interactions per agent. Next to these lines, the arrows indicate the value of fh at which
the transition occurs. This value is plotted as a function of the final time in the inset,
decaying slower than a power law.
3.2. Heterogeneous systems
A homogeneous adamancy in the system, namely that all agents are equally stubborn in
preserving their opinions, is surely a very strong assumption for a human population. In
this context, we have relaxed the condition of homogeneity by allowing a distribution of
adamancy in the population. A random value of the adamancy is drawn initially from
a square distribution for each agent. We have used the mean value of this distribution
as one of the parameters for the phase diagrams, equivalent to the parameter a used
in Fig. 1. In these systems we have observed that the phase diagrams are substantially
unchanged with respect to those of homogeneous adamancy, at least when the width of
the adamancy distribution is within reasonable limits. The only difference to be found
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Figure 3. Necessary time to reach the stationary state, as a function of the fraction
of agents initially endowed with opinion x = 2. We plot the scaled final time (tf/N ,
number of interactions per agent) for k = 100 and (a) a = 100; (b) a = 25, with the
arrows indicating the value of fh at which the transition occurs. Inset: Critical fh as a
function of tf/N (note that the decay is extremely slow, in fact slower than algebraic,
and that the scale is double logarithmic in spite of the fact that the small range in the
vertical axis hinders its appreciation).
is a narrow coexistence phase that appears in the transition lines between phases. One
such case is exemplified by its temporal evolution in Fig. 2(a), where a system with a
distribution of adamancy of width σa = 0.2 evolves to a mixed state of both opinions.
On the other hand, and with the same spirit, we have explored systems that have an
heterogeneous connectivity and homogeneous adamancy. In this case, we chose to draw
a random value of the number of partners at each interaction step. Two distributions
of this variable were considered: an exponentially decaying one and a square one (this
last defined by p(k) = (2〈k〉)−1, k ∈ [0, 2〈k〉]). The results also show little variation
with respect to that of the completely homogeneous system (delta distribution at the
value 〈k〉), as one can see in Fig. 4. These plots show the two mentioned k-distributed
cases with 〈k〉 = 10, next to the homogeneous one for k = 10 (this is the intermediate
case between k = 1 and 100, referred to above). The general picture of three regions
persists: a consensus of opinion 2 above a critical fh, a small region of opinion 1 cornered
in the region of low adamancy and few initially educated agents, and a broad region
of coexistence in the complement. We have also explored power-law distributions of
k, and observed that the phase space remains mostly unchanged. Indeed, an algebraic
distribution of k appropriately chosen to have 〈k〉 = 10 produces a phase space nearly
identical to the one corresponding to the exponential on Fig. 4.
The exponential and the square distributions provide contrasting effects in the
dynamics of opinion imitation. Observe that the exponential one has an excess of small
connectivities with respect to the square one. On the other hand, the square distribution
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Figure 4. Phase diagrams for different distributions of the connectivity, all with
〈k〉 = 10. (a) exponential distribution; (b) delta distribution (homogeneous case) and
(c) square (width 20). Colored as Fig. 1. Observe that the horizontal axis represents
a weight —an “effective” one in this case— of the agent’s opinion, as in Fig. 1.
has an excess of high connectivities with respect to the exponential. When there is an
excess of agents with small connectivity (exponential distribution of k), it is difficult for
those of them supporting opinion 1 to be gained by a pool of opinion 2 partners: the
weight of the few partners may just not be enough. As a result of this, the region of
consensus of opinion 1 is wider. On the other hand, when there is an excess of large
connectivities, the random interactions are able to eventually provide enough partners
with opinion 2. This makes the region of consensus x = 1 shrink.
4. Discussion and conclusions
As mentioned in the introduction, the numerical value of the opinions is a free parameter
of the model. A simple analysis can show that these values have a direct consequence
on the threshold of fh, above which a consensus of the high valued opinion emerges.
For the sake of simplicity, let us consider x1 = 1 and x2 > 1. It is easy to obtain an
evolution equation for fh, the fraction of agents holding opinion 2:
f˙h = (1− fh)
k∑
i=⌈ik⌉
(
k
i
)
f i
h
(1− fh)
k−i − fh
k∑
i=⌈ikx2⌉
(
k
i
)
fk−i
h
(1− fh)
i, (3)
where ik = (a + k)/(1 + x2) and ⌈ik⌉ is the smallest integer larger than ik, which gives
the smallest number of agents holding opinion 2 that are necessary to convince an agent
holding opinion 1. ⌈ikx2⌉ gives the smallest number of agents holding opinion 1 that
are necessary to convince an agent holding opinion 2. Equation (3) can be recast as:
f˙h = fh(1−fh)
k

 k∑
i=⌈ik⌉
(
k
i
)
f i−1 −
k∑
i=⌈ikx2⌉
(
k
i
)
fk−i

 ≡ fh(1−fh)kPk(f), (4)
where f ≡ fh/(1− fh). Note first that, if ik > k (that is, if a > kx2) we get Pk(f) ≡ 0,
and there is no evolution from the initial state (as found in the simulations). If ⌈ikx2⌉ > k
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Figure 5. Analytical phase diagrams for connectivity k = 3, x1 = 1 and a continuous
value of x2 (with x1 < x2). The labels on top of each panel indicate the corresponding
range of x2. Two stationary states are found for a < kx2: consensus of opinion x2
and consensus of opinion x1. For higher values of a a frozen state is obtained. In
parentheses, the first (second) number indicates the minimum number of agents with
opinion x2 (x1) needed to convince an agent with opinion x1 (x2).
(that is, if k/x2 < a < kx2) we get Pk(f) > 0 for all f and therefore the system evolves
to a consensus of opinion 2 for all values of f . For a < k/x2 the different cases for each
value of k must be analyzed separately.
The simplest nontrivial case is the one with k = 2. To convince an agent holding
opinion 2, it is evident that we need 2 agents holding opinion 1, and therefore ⌈i2x2⌉ = 2.
We have two subcases now: x2 ≥ 2 and x2 < 2. In the first subcase we obtain ⌈i2⌉ = 1,
and therefore Pk(f) = f + 1 > 1. In other words, the equilibrium state is consensus of
opinion 2 for all values of the adamancy. On the other hand, if x2 < 2 we have that
if a > x2 − 1, then ⌈i2⌉ = 1 (which implies consensus of opinion 2, as in the previous
subcase), and a < x2 − 1 then ⌈i2⌉ = 2. In this last case we have Pk(f) = f − 1.
Thus, there is an unstable equilibrium if f = 1, i.e. fh = 1/2. If the initial value of
fh is smaller than 1/2 then system converges to a consensus of opinion 1; otherwise, it
converges to a consensus of opinion 2.
For k > 2 the analysis sketched above becomes increasingly more involved. As an
example, Figure 5 shows the three cases with connectivity k = 3 corresponding to all
the possible relations between the two opinion values. Some regions in these diagrams
are simple to understand: as before, if a > kx2 then Pk(f) = 0 and the initial state
is frozen. In the region a < k/x2 there are two possible outcomes: either consensus of
x1 or of x2, separated at a critical value of fh that depends on the adamancy a. The
possible situations are represented as columns in the figure, each one identified by a
pair of numbers in parentheses. For example, in the center panel, the left hand column
reflects the fact that if adamancy is 0 < a < 2/x2−1, the system is attracted by opinion
x2 if more than half the population initially supports it, and by opinion x1 otherwise.
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This means that the transition occurs at the value fh = 0.5. In parentheses, the first
number indicates the minimum number of agents with x2 needed for an agent with x1
to be convinced, and the second number shows the same, interchanging 1 and 2. Since
these numbers are discrete, a structure of columns appears even though adamancy is a
continuous parameter. Observe that this structure is also seen in the simulations, for
example in Fig. 4.
In almost all the phase diagrams an “island” of x = 1 consensus is observed in the
lower left corner of parameter space (Figs. 1, 4 and 5, with the exception of the case
shown in Fig. 5(c), corresponding to very high values of x2). Consider for example a case
with adamancy a = 0. In this case, an agent with opinion x = 1 will preserve it if twice
as many agents with opinion 1 exist in his group of influence, for each agent supporting
opinion 2. As a consequence, in average the transition will happen for fh = 1/3, as
observed in Fig. 1(b). The transition happens at a different value of fh if the relative
value of the opinions is different. For example, if x2 = 3 the threshold is fh = 0.25, if
x2 = 4, fh = 0.2, and so on. Then, the minimum fraction of educated agents needed
to reach consensus of the “right” opinion depends on the relative value of the opinions.
That is, a high valued opinion will need a relatively small number of educated people
to become the ruling one. On the other hand, and as expected, the stubbornness of the
population constitute a negative factor when trying to spread the “right” opinion.
One can see here what at first looks like a paradoxical effect. Observe for example
Fig. 4, where three systems with 〈k〉 = 10 are shown side by side. we see that the worst
situation—meaning that with the least area occupied by opinion 2 in parameter space—
is the case in which the distribution of adamancy is a δ-function (panel (b)). In this case,
indeed, it is impossible to change the mind of the population if the adamancy is greater
than 2〈k〉. On the other hand, in panel (a) we see that an exponentially distributed
adamancy has a significantly larger region of consensus of opinion 2, up to values of
the adamancy a ∼ 4〈k〉. The exponential distribution has its maximum at a = 0, thus
providing most of the times less contacts to the interacting agents. However, its tail
provides more contacts than the average. More contacts make it easier for supporters of
opinion 1 to change their minds by imitation. This process acts effectively as a source
of supporters of opinion 2, improving in the end the behavior of the whole population.
Finally, we also observe that the region of consensus of opinion 1 is smaller for a delta
distribution of adamancy than for an exponential, and even smaller for the uniform
distribution.
In any case, the number of acquaintances of an agent in a social environment is not
easy to establish. In some situations one could assume a power-law distribution as in
small worlds. Yet, in other scenarios of social interest these distributions would not be
realistic: consider for example people driving a car in an urban environment, where the
average number of other drivers would be the same for all the agents. If an exponential
distribution of the number of contacts seems to be favorable to disseminate the “right”
behavior, it can also stabilize the “bad” behavior if the initial fraction of educated people
is small. On the other hand a delta distribution, that seems to reproduce better the
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situation of drivers in a city, exhibits a relatively reduced region where the society
converges to the low valued opinion, but can easily lead to a two clusters state, as it is
observed in many real situations.
In all cases the role of education is crucial: education that can act both through
persuasion of a “core” of the population as well as by the punishment of the “wrong”
behavior. But both persuasion or punishment may also have a negative effect: to
generate a more adamant behavior by imposing too high a pressure on agents not abiding
with the right behavior.
We are aware of the simplicity of the present model, but we think that it provides
a nice picture of the problem of imposing a given behavior in the society. Further
steps will be taken in following studies, in particular along the lines presented in [5],
including the effects of punishment as an additional ingredient in the dynamics. The
role of noise, which is known to play an important role in the formation of consensus
(see for example [11]) will also be subject to investigation.
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